Category Archives: law

Daniel Sokol on evolution, law, and institutions

Here is Daniel Sokol at the Conglomerate in 2008:

I believe that LLSV makes certain assumptions about history and political economy in legal origins that are not exactly supported by the underlying historical record.  A number of scholars have attacked LLSV on these grounds. Nevertheless, I still find myself strangely attracted to LLSV. In many ways, the results are what you would intuitively expect if you were on your own to attempt to rank countries based on investor protection or other similar features. More importantly, a number of the variables that LLSV uses are a bit squishy but we have yet to come up with better cross country measurements. Indeed, as a result of the critiques, LLSV have gotten better as to how they measure shareholder protection. From a policy perspective, the key to change to various bottlenecks requires not merely a top down approach in the change of the legal system but a bottom up approach by the users of these legal systems to overcome various bottlenecks that are regulatory. This makes me believe that over time the common law/civil law distinction will be seen as a rather false one where instead you will find countries lumped into categories based on their ability to respond to local and changing conditions (even the United States, which in recent years may have created increased regulatory bottlenecks such as SOX). This evolutionary approach is what I believe holds the key to understanding how to think about law and institutions.

LLSV refers to the seminal papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny in 1997 (Legal Determinants of External Finance) and 1998 (Law and Finance) which establish a thesis linking common, civil, and hybrid legal regimes to economics development and financial growth. The internal story has to do with the different kinds of investor protection that emerges under these regimes.

Sokol’s argument here resonates with me quite a bit and while it means that policy work that tries to draw conclusions of strict classification runs into some fairly tangible walls, I think the intuition that says that markets and institutions work together in complex and adaptive ways provides some rather good insights into where analytical work might be useful. I’ll be developing this in a post later this week so stay tuned…

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Why Cameras? The Market Solves Better!

Here is the text of an op-ed I submitted to the Columbia Tribune about 2 weeks ago. They have not gotten back to me on whether or not they will publish it, but I think that it is worth reading so I’ll post it here. Key knowledge for people who don’t live in Columbia: Proposition 1 was an initiative to give the police chief the option of placing surveillance cameras downtown.

As a libertarian who identifies politically with Democrats, my initial feelings toward Proposition 1 were mixed. I have a deep-seated distrust of government surveillance, but in some respects I regard surveillance of any kind of public activity an unavoidable consequence of being in public. This takes on more meaning when you consider the leaps in portable surveillance technologies that have happened over the last decade that make surveillance by private citizens in public spaces inevitable.

Consider this. Almost everyone who walks on the street of Columbia has a cell phone with an embedded camera. A lot of these phones, particularly smartphones like Android or the Iphone, have embedded video cameras. These cameras are deployed ubiquitously by citizens recording events in their daily lives: the food they eat, the street performers they see, the accidents and crimes they witness. Citizens without training in journalism are now the most important asset we have in terms of breaking news. As an example, remember the plane that touched down in the Hudson last year. The first footage from the scene wasn’t captured by any government camera or any media on the scene, but rather by a man with his Iphone.

We live in a world where Google is driving cars wired with recording equipment down every road in America to capture pictures and video for Google Street View. This world also includes numerous ways to share information, both audio and video, easily and at practically no cost over the internet. Facebook is a good example of how pervasive social networking is and how easy it is to perform de facto surveillance on people in your social network.

More generally, surveillance technologies are extremely cheap and pervasive. I would hazard a guess that it might cost less than $10,000 to wire downtown Columbia with cheap video cameras. You would even be able to stream videos online live 24/7/365. It is not illegal (and impossible to regulate) the surveillance performed by private citizens, particularly those who own or access property located in Columbia.

The revolution in search also factors in. Google, Wolfram Alpha, and Bing all represent large-scale efforts to make all kinds of data instantly computable. I think that within a year or two we will be able to search in real time the media created by people as they go about their daily lives as the technologies that aggregate and compute data become cheaper and more available.

So this is my argument. Proposition 1 was a non-starter for me because I think it is true that in the next couple of years the availability and usability of surveillance technologies will be so pervasive that government surveillance is unnecessary and indeed irrelevant. I voted against Proposition 1 because I don’t see a need to uniquely grant government with these powers; citizens acting of their own free accord in their daily lives perform practically the same functions.

I also recommend this post on surveillance in New York City from Volokh Conspirator Stewart Baker which contains some related insights that I think function well as an extension to my argument.

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Missouri Attorney General Chris Koster speaks to #YDMO2010

I got this footage from a meet and greet with Missouri Attorney General Chris Koster at a Young Democrats of Missouri convention held last weekend in Springfield, Missouri. He discusses the impact the recession has had on hirings at the Attorney General’s office (since high end law firms aren’t hiring, the AG is now able to hire law grads from Harvard and other Tier 1 law schools) and also the efforts of Lieutenant Governor Peter Kinder to sue the federal government over healthcare reform. Koster makes the argument that Kinder doesn’t have standing to represent Missouri in the first place and that allowing random state officials to sue on behalf of the state leads to  anarchy in the courts, since there’s no mechanism to prevent different state officials from suing each other on behalf of the state of Missouri, which is what these kinds of lawsuits would turn into.

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Missouri State Auditor Susan Montee on civil asset forfeiture

I sat down with Missouri State Auditor Susan Montee last night and talked to her about her 2009 report on civil asset forfeitures in the state of Missouri. I’ll have more to blog about soon, but wanted to highlight a couple things I learned.

The reports she received from prosecutors around the state detailing the extent of civil forfeiture activities were a ‘mess’. Often the records are misplaced or lost or ineptly kept, making her job compiling the the information necessary for a report difficult. There also appears to be little or no oversight of ‘adoptive’ or ‘equitable’ forfeiture, a mechanism that state and local police in Missouri have used in the past to dodge state requirement that proceeds from forfeited assets be turned over to the general fund. The current law requires judicial approval when assets are transferred between state and federal authorities in equitable forfeiture and I think is limited to assets seized with help from the federal government, but I am unable to find evidence that this law is being properly followed or enforced. Indeed, the large amounts of money moved around in this way by Boone County, Laclede County, Butler County, and New Madrid suggest to me that police agencies around the state continue to use adoptive forfeiture to retain control of the proceeds from seized assets for their own purposes.

Missouri law also mandates that civil forfeiture also be accompanied by ‘criminal action’ to prevent innocent people from having their property seized. Unfortunately I don’t know if the descriptor of ‘criminal action’ is equivalent to a conviction; it is still possible to seize and keep property and file charges that are dropped while satisfying the requirement for ‘criminal action’. Of course, this is problematic.

I’ll have more soon; I’ll be meeting Montee again next week to cover the subject in more detail.

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On conversations with unions

Talking to union members is oddly libertarian. They seem to mostly be concerned with property rights. Strange.

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Name this former slave state

That in this free government *all white men are and of right ought to be entitled to equal civil and political rights* [emphasis in the original]; that the servitude of the African race, as existing in these States, is mutually beneficial to both bond and free, and is abundantly authorized and justified by the experience of mankind, and the revealed will of the Almighty Creator, as recognized by all Christian nations; while the destruction of the existing relations between the two races, as advocated by our sectional enemies, would bring inevitable calamities upon both and desolation upon the fifteen slave-holding states.

The answer is here.

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Henry Hyde on property rights and civil asset forfeiture

From Forfeiting Our Property Rights by former Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), published 1995 by the Cato Institute, page 3:

Before going further, I think it appropriate to consider the basic principle that unchecked forfeiture undermines–the right to private property–and why that principle is so important in America, or in any just society. True, we are dealing with an abstract principle we usually take for granted, but the right to own and enjoy property protects and enhances the lives of all citizens. Without it, human being are reduced to misery and want. The stark reality of this truth is never so evident as when a squad of government agents breaks down your door, guns drawn, and confiscates your family home. That might sound dramatic. But too often that is the reality of modern American forfeiture law.

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A thought on legal regimes, legislative processes, and evolution

There is much debate over the European social model, how well it works, and how desirable it is. What is interesting to me is how it came about. I suggest that part of the reason might lie in the institutional infrastructure of these European countries and is a side effect of poor institutional design.

Let’s start with some intuition about legal regimes. Legal regimes are generally categorized in the literature under the two main strains of common law and civil law regimes. There are variants of each, but the important differences are in how each regime is structured. Common law regimes are based on English common law and works this way: legislatures make laws and judges have wide latitude to interpret these laws in context of specific cases. In this way the majority of the actual law is case law, which we can also call judge-made law. Inherently I think there are two advantages here. The first is that common law regimes are more responsive to exogenous shocks and citizen demands because judges can interpret and apply laws contextually. The second advantage is that one can take broad principles, like freedom of speech, and apply them easily. Civil law regimes are based conceptually on the Justinian code and finds its most prominent expression in France, whose civil law regime was heavily influenced by the Napoleonic code. In civil law regimes, the law, whether principle or rule, is codified by a legislature. In this setup judges have vastly less latitude and adjudicate on a bright-line basis. Case law in this institutional paradigm is vastly less influential where it exists at all. The disadvantage here is that the law is vastly less responsive to exogenous shocks since judges do not have much ability to interpret these laws contextually.

So the next intuition is how policies are formed and wrongs redressed in civil law vs. common law regimes. On a broad, theoretical level, my intuition is that common law regimes are less likely to have legislation redress wrongs because citizens have options in courts. Consider two nations, one with a civil law regime and one one with a common law regime. In the nation with common law, citizens faced with uncertain legal footing due to technological change can obtain rulings to extend and clarify laws like the 4th Amendment, for example. In the civil law regime, the laws are inflexible, and citizens cannot obtain the same rulings in a court of law; their option is to enact new laws. In this second nation, the legislature is thus vastly more important. Laws are inflexible, so they must be changed, and legislators are put more often into the position of forecasting from afar the impacts of the legislation they propose based on singular datapoints.

The more active a legislature is, the more policies it enacts and the more money it spends. Additionally, legislators are often unqualified to actually write and interpret laws, which require sometimes substantial legal education and intellectual sophistication. The claim is that legislators are worse at writing laws to respond to exogenous, far off shocks than judges are at creating case law based on immediate, contextual information. Additionally, independent judges are often circumscribed by what they can do; though they can rule on the legality of specific issues they cannot create entire social programs to respond to systemic issues. But legislators can…and there are lots of legislators, both liberal and conservative, whose first instinct when approached with a problem is to think how a government program might be a solution.

So the claim is that civil law regimes are much more susceptible to policy-making by legislatures, which in Europe particularly has resulted in nations designed to legislate problems rather than adjudicating them. This results in the inevitable growth of social programs as citizens are constrained in their options when seeking responsive and flexible legal relief from the judiciary and are forced to pursue legislative relief.

Let me note here that I know I haven’t presented any data here; the argument I wanted to make here is analytical, not empirical, though I do have data that I’ll present in later posts on the subject.

Hat Tip: I am indebted to many fruitful conversations with Ron Harstad on the subject several years ago as well as conversations with Abhi Sivasailam more recently.

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Against civil asset forfeiture, Part I

During my sophomore year in high school, I competed in policy debate. My partner and I chose to run an affirmative advocating the end of the system known as civil asset forfeiture, a relic of ancient English common law that has made an ugly reappearance since the passage of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in 1970. This topic has always remained on my radar and since that debate topic I have kept current with both the literature on the subject and have written several essays against it.

The basic premise of civil asset forfeiture is that under a truly ancient and archaic legal theory, the government can level a charge of being the product or accessory to a crime against property itself. Note that this completely changes the game. In criminal prosecutions, the government has the burden of proof and is held to a standard of reasonable doubt. Additionally, defendants enjoy numerous (though not always sufficient) protections, like the right to counsel and the right to due process. In civil actions, and particularly in a civil forfeiture action, the government only has to establish a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain a forfeiture.

Note the trick here. A preponderance of the evidence standard is something that few people are familiar with, in part because it’s used as a criteria for adjudicating guilt so rarely. But consider the trap this puts an innocent person. The government seizes an asset on some arbitrary charge and provides an informant’s affidavit as evidence. An innocent citizen now has to prove a negative in order to retain the rights to their property by providing evidence of superior quantity and quality. This is nearly impossible for citizens implicated in the vast majority of civil forfeiture actions who now have to prove that their property (not themselves) are innocent. Additionally, since the forfeiture action vests against the property, not the property owner, the owner’s complicity in the alleged crime is actually irrelevant.

Imagine a paid informant provides evidence that a black man of some variety will be transporting a large amount of cash for a criminal activity through a certain town. On the strength of that reasonably vague affidavit, the police can stop and search almost at will. If they find a black man actually in possession of a large amount of cash, the affidavit constitutes probable cause for the seizure and evidence for the forfeiture action, regardless of whether or not the man is a criminal or the cash is for illicit purposes. The property owner now has to provide evidence that outweighs a sworn affidavit describing in generic but apt language the suspicion vested by the police on the strength of an informant who has no accountability for his testimony and is paid to provide the police with justification for warrants. In this case, this means accounting for the cash in every last detail of where it was from and where it was going. Generally, this is a costly prohibitive burden on the politically weak, particularly when traveling. One must deal with the expense of travel and the opportunity costs of having to be in other jurisdictions for proceedings, along with the cost of an attorney and the cost of proving impossible negatives.

In other words, this forfeiture can happen without the DA ever filing a charge. The calculation now is: we found a criminal and took his cash and we don’t even have to go to the expense and trouble of prosecution. The informant is even eligible for a cut of the seized property. This presumably exists to incentivize criminals to turn their associates by holding out the promise of financial gain. Note that when there is no check on informant credibility, this is a system that can be gamed by criminals for money.

It gets worse.

So many states have laws specifically deeming that the proceeds of forfeiture return to specific general funds, like education or healthcare. So police departments should have no incentive to seize without really having probable cause, right? Wrong. The federal government in many cases helps state and local police agencies subvert their own laws through a clever loophole. The loophole works like this: the state police find an asset in an appropriate situation where forfeiture is easy and unlikely to be contested. They then ‘detain’ the asset until a federal agent arrives and initiates a seizure under federal law. The asset is then liquidated and the local police get a kickback that is usually around 80% and goes straight to their budget.

In one fell swoop several fundamental checks and balances are cut out of the picture. First, there is the obvious dishonesty and travesty of letting one level of government actively subvert the will and intent of another level. Second, this allows police departments to become in theory self-funding, which eliminates the legislative check on executive power, since the legislature’s control of the public funds now becomes meaningless. This is a subversion of democracy that happens on both the state and federal level.

This is the first in what I intend to be a series of posts on this subject. Later posts will explore the specific constitutional violations that accrue through the use of civil asset forfeiture, the harms of letting police departments self-fund, and several other nuances to this story.

I am indebted to Mickey Klebanov, David Kramer, and Eric Kafka for the numerous conversations we had on this topic.

Addendum: Ilya Somin at the Volokh Conspiracy blogs about civil asset forfeiture here. Recommended.

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The Nonlinear Dynamics of International Conflict

Wolfson, Puri, and Martinelli write in the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1992:

We propose a dynamic model of the interaction between two rival powers. It is not an easy model, because it involves nonlinear difference equations; yet it is simple in the sense that it involves only a few variables. Parsimony shows that complexity and apparent paradox need not arise from the multiplicity of factors but from their nonlinear connections. Complications certainly may be introduced such as considering more than two states and alliances among them (Wolfson 1973) as well as further specification of expectation formation. They might improve some future statistical investigations, but the theory has no need for those hypotheses to explain the complexity of the historical record. Occam’s razor suggests that small is beautiful.

Continue reading

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On Competing Federalism

John Payne at the Show-Me Institute has this to say about state legislative opposition to the reach of the federal government’s power:

Setting aside for the moment the specific content of the amendment, it is great to see Missouri and other states attempting to use the nearly forgotten tools of interposition and nullification to stop the federal government from abusing its powers. Of course, these are just tools that can be used for good (such as when Wisconsin nullified the Fugitive Slave Act in the 1850s) or ill (such as George Wallace attempting to preserve segregation). However, all else being equal, the more a political system is localized, the less dysfunctional it is likely to be, because the politicians are not as removed from the people. Consequently, anything that takes power away from the federal government and gives it to the states, or from the states to the counties and municipalities, or from the municipalities to the neighborhoods and individuals, should, as a general rule, be applauded.

While I understand very pertinently the reasons John makes these claims, I come to a different conclusion. Or, at least, I offer a different interpretation. I don’t think it’s right to say that the more a political system is localized, the less dysfunctional it will be. If anything, some of the worst abuses of government happen at the local level, where specific people or organizations can gain control of the executive powers of government, including and particularly police power.

In this sense the analysis misses the point. Devolution of power is not strictly a good thing. The desired aim should be to maintain an balance of power between governments. In some fashion we can think of this balance of power as competition in the sense that governments compete for citizens. Federal, state, and local governments all offer different goods and services to the public; some goods and services are unique to the level of government (like diplomacy to federal governments and trash services to municipalities) and not open to competition, while some goods and services are open to competition between governments. Another way to say it is that that governments compete for the right to regulate different things to citizens. Perhaps the most important service governments offer citizens is protection from other governments: the federal government, for instance, serves a very useful recourse against systemic racism in state and local governments. From the other direction, state and local sovereignty provide a hedge against excesses of federal power.

In some sense this interpretation of federalism says that a balance of power between competing governments best serves individual interests. I stress the “competing” here; looking at America in that light it is clear that there has been a big shift in consumer preferences away from federal provision of goods and services and towards other lower-level government entities.

Note that when governments compete, they offer justifications for elevating their power and reach relative to other governments. While governments might question the justification for other governments they never as a rule question the justification for government itself. In this sense the statist game is a rigged game and I suggest it points us in the directions of thinking of governments as networks for politicians and bureaucrats. The game of questioning the legitimacy of another government or its power is a way for politicians to elide the complex interactions between local, state, and federal governments.

Interested readers will find much to ponder in the collected work of Laurence Tribe and Steven Calabresi. Particularly, I might point you towards Tribe’s 1977 article in the Harvard Law Review and Calabresi’s 1995 article in the Michigan Law Review.

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On New Things: The L3C

Wikipedia reports:

The L3C is a low-profit limited liability company (LLC), that functions via a business modality that is a hybrid legal structure combining the financial advantages of the limited liability company, an LLC, with the social advantages of a non-profit entity. An L3C runs like a regular business and is profitable. However, unlike a for-profit business, the primary focus of the L3C is not to make money, but to achieve socially beneficial aims, with profit making as a secondary goal. The L3C thus occupies a niche between the for-profit and charitable sectors. As of September, 2009, an L3C can only be formed in the states of Michigan[1], Vermont, Wyoming, Utah, the Crow Indian Nation and the Oglala Sioux Tribe. On August 4, 2009, Gov. Pat Quinn signed Illinois‘ L3C Bill SBO239 and the law will take effect on January 1, 2010. [2]

HT: Sam Burnett.

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A Thought On the Fair Tax Debate

Missouri will soon decide whether to replace its income tax with a revenue neutral sales tax. This proposal of course has attracted much debate, some rational, some strident. This post was inspired by two conversations: one with Lily Fortel of Grassroots Organizing, a group of political activists on the left, and Abhi Sivasailam, who co-wrote a policy analysis of the fair tax proposal with Dr. Joe Haslag.

My general principle of goverment is that we should treat most of our important government programs as if we were engineers designing and operating HVAC systems (by way of example). The difference of course, is that HVAC systems aren’t political.

So here’s the deal with how the taxonomy of taxes can be misleading. Sales taxes, by definition, are regressive taxes: they apportion liability regardless of income level. Graduated income taxes, by definition, are progressive: you can tax people by their income level.

But here’s the problem. These are definitions of taxes in a vacuum. In the real world parameters matter and allow us to make more nuanced judgments. A bad income tax is not necessarily superior to a good sales tax.

American conservatives dislike our income tax structure. It is costly to comply with, inefficient, and applies high marginal tax rates to our most productive citizens, stifling innovation and economic growth on the margin. These are legitimate concerns. Liberals, of course, are a far more varied group, but the general consensus is that sales taxes are too blunt an instrument of fiscal policy, since it is harder to exempt low-income people.

But I suggest that a re-evaluation of the costs are in order. Implicitly, complying with an income tax is extremely costly on every level. One must keep records, and receipts, and spend many hours doing tedious calculations and revisions or outsource it to a professional; the more successful one is the worse this problem becomes because you start having to deal with more complicated tax structures. The incentive to cheat on one’s taxes rises with income, and the richer you become the more tax shelters of some variety you can buy your way into. We spend inordinate amounts of money on monitoring and enforcement through revenue departments, who are unique amongst all government entities in the amount of scorn and derision flung upon them by virtually everyone of every political stripe.

Keep in mind this basic fact of our income tax system. Many people never file or sufficiently pay their taxes and get away scot-free because the IRS simply can’t monitor everyone.

The costs of complying with a sales tax are far simpler, since instead of dealing with individual citizens, you deal with the far smaller number of businesses, which are far more easily regulated. There are already straightforward and efficient mechanisms for enforcing and collecting point-of-sales taxes. Businesses face far great incentives to meaningfully comply, since sales taxes are usually tied to the status of their business license. Functionally, increasing a sales tax would at best only marginally increase the cost of collecting the tax. You don’t need much extra machinery to scale up or down.

There are other arguments relevant to this debate, but the point here is simple: we should consider the implicit costs of the economy-wide market distortions that exist relative to a world in which sales taxes replaces some or all of the tax revenue for governments.

Right? Because a world where there is an artificial market for tax professionals, for example, is  a world where talent that might find itself pursuing other more productive options is drawn into preparing income taxes for people. A world in which there is an artificial market for tax professionals who help you shelter your income from taxation is a world in which very smart people are incentivized on the margin  to pursue careers in wealth management and protection as opposed to wealth creation. There is a very clear tradeoff in the choices people make career-wise; it is a common theme that grossly oversized incomes in the financial sector drew some of the world’s greatest minds away from professions like teaching, medicine, the hard sciences, etc, over the past twenty years. In some sense the forgone benefits of the advancement in other fields due to the financial sector brain drain is incalculably great. Likewise, industries that exist to add nothing of value but to enforce and monitor a tax system that is comparatively less efficient are functional brain drains. Perhaps the incentives are lower, but they are systemic. Forgone economic growth is particularly hard to calculate, demonstrate, and weigh, but it is surely important.

In a nutshell, income taxes are vastly more expensive to enforce and monitor and generate large industries devoted to servicing income taxes and not doing other productive things. Sales taxes don’t have any of those liabilities. To extend the nod to engineering this fits the maxim that the best interface is the most idiotpoof because it’s the cheapest to maintain. I leave the implication up to the reader.

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Thoughts From A Debate Tournament

I judged several rounds of debate at the Heart of America National Forensic League District tournament at Liberty High School in Kansas City this past weekend with my friends Carl Werner and Rick Puig, both former Kansas City public forum debaters; they also own DB8Zone, producing quality LD and public forum briefs.

My high school debate career was 4 years of policy for Parkway North in St. Louis. Later on I debated at the University of Missouri-Columbia, where I spent 2 years debating policy on the NDT/CEDA circuit. Curiously, for some time I was involved in Cross-x.com, through which I met, virtually speaking, Phil Kerpen. I had many great conversations with Phil over the years and he has an exceptionally sharp mind, though he is far more radically libertarian (dare I say conservative?) than I am.

At this tournament I saw some interesting rounds of value debate (Lincoln-Douglas) over the topic of jury nullification. Debaters on this topic tended to make extreme arguments, getting away with claims like ‘jury nullification overturns entire bodies of law’. That’s true when multiple juries nullify multiple trials over the same issue with the same law, but doesn’t generally exist in the more common and likely example of juries nullifying specific trials on a one time basis. I thought the argument was generally stronger in favor of the affirmative on this topic, though I did vote negative in one of these rounds.

Policy debate results were mixed. I think I judged all three teams who qualified to nationals, and was fairly impressed by one. They ran an affirmative expanding Medicaid reimbursement to midwives, making an argument that the existing restrictions on reimbursement excluding midwives constituted a meaningful and illegitimate restriction on women’s reproductive rights, linking it to larger claims about biopolitics and governmentality. The negative made arguments about topicality, federalism, and the economy. The level of debate seemed fairly comparable to St. Louis debate and the debaters seem to know what to do when they recognize that their judge is familiar with the structure and language of policy debate. I do remain concerned about the short and intermediate viability of policy debate teams particularly in the state as school districts face budget shortfalls.

The sole public forum debate round I judged was the break round to nationals (a 7-judge panel). The topic was affirmative action. I believe I was the only judge with any policy experience, and also the only judge to vote negative in a 6-1 decision for the affirmative. I’d voted on a framework argument advanced in the initial speech by the con side making the claim that we should evaluate oppression and inequality from a class-based, not a race-based, perspective. I’m not sure I can claim to have made a correct decision, but I found it curious that I was the only judge in the round that evaluated that framework.

I am hearing good things about debate in Missouri this year. More high school teams are traveling and receiving TOC bids, and the team at Missouri State did fantastically well at the NDT last year. I don’t know if my anecdotal sample lets me come to any conclusions about how vibrant the circuit remains, and it’s hard to comparatively evaluate teams from this year against teams I remember. I find good argumentative development and not a lot of strategic development, but that’s generally true of high school debate in all years.

After the entirety of my experience, I conclude the the single most urgent problem facing debaters is the lack of consistent quality judging at tournaments. It is a hard thing to get qualified former debaters to high school tournaments, mostly because they’re in college and the short distance they’re willing to travel is inversely proportional to the amount they get paid. I am gratified to see several former debaters continue to be active in the activity, coaching and teaching debate at high schools, and I am gratified to see the restrictions on competition imposed by the Missouri State High School Athletics Association ease after years of diligent pressure.

The other problem facing high school debate programs is the one no one wants to talk about. Where does the funding come from in rocky financial times?

Thought: do any charter schools offer debate programs?

Oh, and if any former debater or interested person is interested in judging at state and national qualifiers in the upcoming month, information on tournaments is available on Cross-x.com, here.

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Traiberman-Li Blog

Two of my former high school debate friends, Sharon Traiberman and Jimmy Li, have graduated college and have started a blog. I highly recommend it for people interested in good analytical arguments, particularly with regard to economics and ethics.

On an aside, Sharon Traiberman remains one of the people I felt were truly treated unfairly by the the politics of Missouri high school debate. He has always been a brilliant thinker and unfortunately innovation outside of the narrow political box of Missouri high school debate has never been consistently rewarded.

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